Русская версияStefan Wolff is a professor of political science and the director
of the Center for International Crisis Management and Conflict
Resolution at the University of Nottingham's School of Politics and
International Relations.
He is also an author and media commentator
on international affairs.
DW-WORLD.DE: Do you think the Russian agenda went beyond the
official line of defending South Ossetia's claim of autonomy? Some
observers have said Moscow is intent on regime change in Tbilisi.
What could this mean for the region as a whole?
Stefan Wolff: Russia's agenda has always been more than just
"peacekeeping" in South Ossetia -- and Abkhazia for that matter.
Primarily, Russia has been worried about NATO getting too close,
and for a long time it seemed that keeping the separatist conflicts
in Georgia in an unresolved state, but with a relatively stable
ceasefire in place, would just be enough. But when Mikhail
Saakashvili assumed power in 2004, partly on an agenda to re-unite
Georgia, tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow grew and the ceasefire
on the ground became more and more unstable.
Bildunterschrift:
Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift:
Stefan Wolff
NATO's Bucharest Summit in April this year confirmed once more that
Georgia would be a welcome member of the alliance once its
conflicts were resolved. So this is now about both preventing
conflict resolution in the long term, teaching Georgia a lesson
about Russia's determination and the limited influence of the West
in the region, and setting a precedent for anyone else in the
region who might be toying with the idea of NATO membership against
Russian wishes.
If hostilities were to resume and Russian troops were to go further
and enter Tbilisi to overthrow the government, what would happen
then? Would Russia claim back the country as part of the Federation
or install its own puppet regime?
At the moment, it does not seem likely that Russia will play a
direct part in overthrowing the Georgian government, but it has
done much to destroy Georgia's military capabilities. If anything,
Saakashvili will be the source of his own downfall when people will
start asking why Georgia went on the offensive in South Ossetia and
so gravely misjudged Russia's willingness to respond so swiftly and
effectively, if in the end rather disproportionately.
Bildunterschrift:
Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift:
Saakashvili may have brought his own career to an end
Let's not forget that Saakashvili's authority was severely
challenged by the opposition late last year and earlier this year.
When the dust has settled, the opposition may well gather momentum
again and try to oust Saakashvili. The danger in this would be a
prolonged political stalemate, possibly violence similar to the
early 1990s when the first post-Soviet leader of Georgia, Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, was overthrown by internal opposition and replaced by
former Soviet foreign minister Edvard Shevardnadse.
Any new, post-Saakashvili government would not necessarily be more
pro-Russian -- Georgians are overwhelmingly hostile to their bigger
neighbor -- but it would hopefully be more realistic about the
balance of power in the Caucasus and the need for reasonably stable
and constructive relations with Russia. I think a change of
government in Georgia is quite likely in the near future, but a
pro-Russian puppet regime, or a reintegration of Georgia into the
Russian federation is not. It is unclear, however, whether Russia
would not strengthen its ties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia to
such an extent that these two regions would become part of Russia
in all but name.
What, in your opinion, has been Russia's ultimate goal in the
conflict?
For Russia, this is very much about its own security interests:
keeping NATO, the EU, and the US at bay, asserting its role as the
regional hegemon, and controlling as much as possible the oil and
gas resources of the former Soviet Union as a whole. As the
development of the situation in Georgia indicates, Russia is quite
prepared to pursue these interests by using military force,
certainly as long as the outcome of any hostilities is clearly
pre-determined. It is one thing to confront Georgia militarily, it
would be quite another to take on a country like Ukraine.
Bildunterschrift:
Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift:
The BTC pipeline has reportedly been a Russian target
As far as energy control is concerned, this is an interesting
"side-show" of the current conflict in Georgia. The BTC pipeline
runs through Georgia and is the main route for oil from the Caspian
Sea, especially Azerbaijan, to reach world markets. For Azerbaijan,
this is currently the only way to escape Russian control of the
pipeline infrastructure, which they have resisted for many years.
At the same time, it is thus also the only access that world
markets have to Central Asia's resources that cannot be cut off by
Russia. Long-term instability in Georgia could make the BTC
pipeline too volatile and could hand another big prize to Russia,
namely control over the distribution of Caspian and Central Asian
energy resources.
How much do you think this campaign was down to Russian President
Medvedev and how much is the work of Prime Minister Putin? It seems
to have been more in keeping with Putin's plans for a return to
Russia's former glories than Medvedev's supposed vision for Russia.
It is pretty clear that Putin has taken full control of the
situation, but it is not clear whether anything would be different
with Medvedev in charge. There is broad agreement between the two
and among Russia's security elite about the country's vital
interests. Medvedev might seem a more pleasant character, but he
is, if anything, an unknown quantity.
Bildunterschrift:
Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift:
Some say Medvedev was fighting Putin's war
Putin is more predictable, has a track record of how he handles
crises, and knows all the major players in the former Soviet Union
and the West. His game is very much realpolitik. He will teach
Georgia a harsh lesson, set an example for the region, and use
every means possible to get rid of Saakashvili.
What do you expect the international reaction to be should Russia
restart hostilities and complete the occupation of Georgia?
There would be a lot of rhetoric and high-level shuttle diplomacy.
The opponents of a new EU-Russia agreement within the EU would
probably manage to delay negotiations, but other than that not much
is going to happen. The OSCE and UN are deadlocked over the issue.
There is a lame-duck presidency in the US right now, with a whole
host of other security problems to handle, and no amount of
rhetoric from the president and vice-president can disguise this
fact.
The EU and Russia need each other too much -- as energy supplier
and market -- to allow their relations to become seriously
disturbed over the long term. So I don't see either a full-scale
Russian occupation of Georgia nor military aid from the West in the
future.
The United States is the main backer and arms supplier of Georgia,
its most staunch ally in its bid for NATO membership and has troops
based there. How high is the risk of the US under a new president
getting involved in any future conflict on a military level?
Bildunterschrift:
Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift:
The US and Russia are unlikely to fight over Georgia
This risk is very limited. It is neither in the US interest to have
a military confrontation with Russia over Georgia, nor can I see
any spare US capacity for such a military adventure. Let's not
forget that the two countries have been through far more serious
crises and managed an entire Cold War without direct military
engagement.
The Kremlin denounced Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili as a
war criminal on Monday. What could the reason be for this statement
and what does Russia hope to achieve by portraying Saakashvili as
such?
From what we know at this stage, several thousand civilians have
been killed during the battle over Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's
capital. Moreover, there have been many reports from refugees about
ethnic cleansing of South Ossetian villages by Georgian forces.
None of these reports have so far been independently verified, but
if they prove true, there would be reasons for an indictment of
Saaksahvili, and possibly some of his commanders in the field, on
the grounds of violations of the Geneva Convention.
Leaving aside, for a moment, whether this will actually happen, it
serves two purposes. It undermines Saakashvili, no matter whether
he has a democratic mandate or not, and it underlines the
near-impossibility of a future conflict settlement that would see
the reintegration of South Ossetia into Georgia. Without mentioning
Kosovo, a very obvious parallel is established here.
The EU was in danger of appearing impotent as the crisis wore on
without solution. What can the EU do to save face in dealing with
the aftermath of this war and in the future should this conflict be
resurrected?
Bildunterschrift:
Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift:
Sarkozy had his hands full with the crisis as EU president
The EU obviously takes this crisis very seriously and is engaged at
the highest level, with French President Sarkozy, whose country
holds the EU presidency at the moment, heading to Moscow and
Tbilisi while French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner visited both
capitals together with his Finish counterpart, who is the current
chairman-in-office of the OSCE. From the beginning, the EU has
stressed the need for an immediate end to military hostilities and
begun to explore what possible deal could be reached to this
effect.
The kind of shuttle diplomacy pursued since the weekend, is the
standard diplomatic response in such situations, and the very fact
that the EU has been involved from the very beginning and at the
highest level is a clear sign of its significance as an
international player. Even if the EU fails to bring about a
cease-fire deal, and I am not at all sure that this will indeed be
the case, this is not necessarily the failure of the EU. Quite
apart from the fact that no other international organization seems
anymore capable at the moment, blaming the EU for a continuation of
the fighting would absolve Moscow and Tbilisi of their
responsibility, and they are, after all, the ones doing the
shooting on the ground.
There never was a military option here for the EU, and I cannot see
any member state supporting such an adventure. This is not the kind
of conflict that can be solved with military intervention, nor does
the EU have the capabilities to do so. Again, this is not a
question of impotence, but of sensible political calculation. The
EU is very good at mediating and implementing agreements that the
conflict parties on the ground are willing to live with, and this
is exactly what a conflict like this needs. Escalating violence by
bringing in a third conflict party would not bring a stable
solution any closer.
What can we expect from the emergency meeting of foreign ministers
in Brussels on Wednesday?
Hopefully, by Wednesday we will have greater clarity about what a
possible cease-fire deal might look like and what role the EU can
play in its implementation. I would then expect the EU foreign
ministers to approve concrete EU actions and a timetable for their
implementation. This could go as far as the deployment of EU
peacekeeping forces, but more probable perhaps, because of likely
Russian opposition to that, would be EU and/or OSCE cease-fire
monitors. Such a deal, especially if it involved the OSCE, could be
acceptable to Russia, give Russians an opportunity to participate
and might then also gain approval by the UN Security Council.
(Deutsche Welle)
more info >>
<< Back