Русская версияStefan Wolff is a professor of political science and the director
of the Center for International Crisis Management and Conflict
Resolution at the University of Nottingham's School of Politics and
International Relations.
He is also an author and media commentator
on international affairs.
DW-WORLD.DE: What is the strategic importance of the region in
terms of energy security?
Stefan Wolff :The region is an important transit area of oil and
gas from the Caspian Sea region, particularly for the EU, which, as
a whole, imports around 50 percent of its energy, and imports are
predicted to rise to 70 percent over the next two decades. Half of
these imports come from Russia, which has been viewed with some
unease in the light of Russia using energy as a foreign and
security policy instrument. Even if this may not, yet, be directed
directly against the EU, the Union would be affected by events
similar to the crisis between Russia and Ukraine at the end of 2005
when Russia cut off supplies to enforce a new pricing policy on
Ukraine
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Several pipelines cross through Georgia
In this context the south Caucasus acquires importance for the EU
energy market as an alternative supplier and a transit area.
However, even this needs to be put into perspective: Caspian Sea
oil reserves make up around 3 percent to 4 percent and gas reserves
4 percent to 6 percent of proven world reserves. Nonetheless,
European and US investors have become heavily engaged in
exploration, extraction and pipeline infrastructure, notably the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which has a current volume of 1
million barrels a day, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline,
which runs alongside the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to the
Turkish city of Erzurum. From there, the Nabucco gas pipeline
project is supposed to extend supplies to the EU, especially
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. Construction on the Nabucco
line is to begin in 2010, and would further benefit from a planned
trans-Caspian pipeline integrating at least part Turkmenistan's
reserves. Another, relatively low-capacity, pipeline is the
Baku-Supsa/Batumi pipeline with a daily capacity of around 250,000
barrels.
Is there any great risk that this localized skirmish may turn into
the next Oil War or Cold War?
The current violence in Georgia has potentially longer-term
implications on the sustainability of some of these projects and
may yet again raise the chances of alternative transport routes
either through Russia or through China or Iran. None of these are
particularly attractive to the EU.
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Russia has used energy supplies to put political pressure on former
Soviet states
Going through Russia would simply increase Russian leverage by
consolidating the Kremlin's hold on post-Soviet energy resources in
terms of both exporting and importing countries. China, in all
likelihood would be a major consumer rather than a mere transit
area, and the logistics of oil and gas imports via China would be
prohibitively expensive for European consumers. While Iran would
not be a consumer in the same way that China would be, there is the
issue of tensions between Iran and the West and the fact that
exports through Iran would add to the dependency on stability in
the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
However, the relatively limited reserves in the Caspian Sea make it
seem relatively unlikely that violence in Georgia will cause a new
oil war. It does, however, put a spotlight on the role of Russia
and is quite likely to lead to a worsening of relations between
Russia and the West in the short term. But I don't think that we
are on the brink of a new Cold War.
As much as Europe may depend on Russia as a supplier and transit
country for much of its energy needs, as much does Russia depend on
Europe as a market and supplier of the very technology upon which
its current oil and gas revenues are built. So the dependency is
mutual, and this creates conditions for a cold peace rather than a
cold war.
Finally, the violence in Georgia at the moment is really not about
oil. It does, however, highlight the interdependence between local
conflicts and global energy security. Moreover, the possible
threats to a transit route through Georgia have been well known
since the planning stages of any of the current pipelines and
pipeline projects, so the potential for disruption, and the costs
associated with it, had to be calculated at the time of making a
decision about these projects.
Would the US ever consider intervening militarily to secure the
South Caucasus oil pipelines?
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The United States is current too stretched for a conflict with
Russia
At the moment, this is extremely unlikely. Militarily, the US is
overstretched as it is and unlikely to risk a major military
confrontation with Russia. There is a chance, though, that as part
of a cease-fire agreement between Russia and Georgia, an EU
peacekeeping force will be dispatched to Georgia. Part of its
mandate -- formally or informally -- could be protecting Western
investments and interests in the region, including the security of
pipelines.
How likely is it that Russia could take over the south Caucasus
region through which the oil pipelines to the West run; and what
effect would this have on the power balance in Europe and Central
Asia?
First of all, I don't think that Russia intends to take over the
South Caucasus region. This would be a very expensive military
adventure, and a long-term mistake. Russia has found it impossible
to maintain control in Afghanistan in the 1980s and had extreme
difficulty asserting itself in Chechnya. This is not to say that
Russia will easily relinquish the control that it now has gained in
Georgia, but it will do so most likely through proxy forces and
symbolic troop deployments.
The balance of power in the post-Soviet region has not shifted
either, what has changed is that anyone who doubted Russia's
resolve to establish and defend its role as the regional hegemon
has had these doubts removed in an unequivocal way. The same goes
for Europe: the EU dependency on oil and gas from the Caspian Sea
suppliers stands at around 5 percent, not insignificant, but at the
moment not decisive either. The question is more about the
long-term viability of the south Caucasus as supply source and
transit area, but even this has to be seen in the context of the
relatively low total proven reserves of the Caspian Sea region.
Europe depends heavily on the oil coming through the region as it
bypasses Russia, which has shown it has no qualms about shutting
off the oil in the past. How should the EU respond to any threat to
its energy supply brought on by Russian aggression?
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The war in Georgia has proven Russia's resolve as a regional power
We have to consider different scenarios here. At the one end of the
spectrum, Russia could threaten a total cut-off of energy supplies
to the EU, but this would damage Russia as much as the EU as it
would lose one of its main sources of revenue. At the other end of
the spectrum, Russia would prove to be an absolute reliable
supplier with trade and political relations totally separate. This
is equally unlikely given that the Russian state controls both
energy sources and pipeline infrastructure.
Most likely Russia will use its pricing policy as an instrument of
political pressure, and the EU and Russia will prevent each other
from gaining a foothold in each other's energy markets. Western
companies will be prevented from acquiring any significant stake in
Russia's oil and gas companies while Russian companies will be
prevented from investing into the EU energy market. In the long
term, however, the EU is better placed than Russia: it can continue
to explore alternative oil and gas supply sources, especially from
North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, as well as alternative
energy sources, including renewables and traditional sources such
as coal and nuclear energy. We must not overstate the danger of a
Russian "aggression" or assume worst-case scenarios of an energy
war between the EU and Russia.
(Deutsche Welle)
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